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Abstract
Bayesian models of multisensory perception traditionally address the problem of
estimating an underlying variable that is assumed to be the cause of the two sen-
sory signals. The brain, however, has to solve a more general problem: it also has
to establish which signals come from the same source and should be integrated,
and which ones do not and should be segregated. In the last couple of years, a
few models have been proposed to solve this problem in a Bayesian fashion. One
of these has the strength that it formalizes the causal structure of sensory signals.
We first compare these models on a formal level. Furthermore, we conduct a psy-
chophysics experiment to test human performance in an auditory-visual spatial
localization task in which integration is not mandatory. We find that the causal
Bayesian inference model accounts for the data better than other models.
Keywords: causal inference, Bayesian methods, visual perception.
1 Multisensory perception
In the ventriloquist illusion, a performer speaks without moving his/her mouth while moving a
puppet’s mouth in synchrony with his/her speech. This makes the puppet appear to be speaking.
This illusion was first conceptualized as ”visual capture”, occurring when visual and auditory stimuli
exhibit a small conflict ([1, 2]). Only recently has it been demonstrated that the phenomenon may be
seen as a byproduct of a much more flexible and nearly Bayes-optimal strategy ([3]), and therefore
is part of a large collection of cue combination experiments showing such statistical near-optimality
[4, 5]. In fact, cue combination has become the poster child for Bayesian inference in the nervous
system.
In previous studies of multisensory integration, two sensory stimuli are presented which act as cues
about a single underlying source. For instance, in the auditory-visual localization experiment by
Alais and Burr [3], observers were asked to envisage each presentation of a light blob and a sound
click as a single event, like a ball hitting the screen. In many cases, however, the brain is not only
posed with the problem of identifying the position of a common source, but also of determining
whether there was a common source at all. In the on-stage ventriloquist illusion, it is indeed primar-
ily the causal inference process that is being fooled, because veridical perception would attribute
independent causes to the auditory and the visual stimulus.
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To extend our understanding of multisensory perception to this more general problem, it is necessary
to manipulate the degree of belief assigned to there being a common cause within a multisensory
task. Intuitively, we expect that when two signals are very different, they are less likely to be per-
ceived as having a common source. It is well-known that increasing the discrepancy or inconsistency
between stimuli reduces the influence that they have on each other [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11]. In auditory-
visual spatial localization, one variable that controls stimulus similarity is spatial disparity (another
would be temporal disparity). Indeed, it has been reported that increasing spatial disparity leads to a
decrease in auditory localization bias [1, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 2, 18, 19, 20, 21]. This decrease also
correlates with a decrease in the reports of unity [19, 21]. Despite the abundance of experimental
data on this issue, no general theory exists that can explain multisensory perception across a wide
range of cue conflicts.
2 Models
The success of Bayesian models for cue integration has motivated attempts to extend them to situa-
tions of large sensory conflict and a consequent low degree of integration. In one of recent studies
taking this approach, subjects were presented with concurrent visual flashes and auditory beeps and
asked to count both the number of flashes and the number of beeps [11]. The advantage of the
experimental paradigm adopted here was that it probed the joint response distribution by requiring
a dual report. Human data were accounted for well by a Bayesian model in which the joint prior
distribution over visual and auditory number was approximated from the data. In a similar study,
subjects were presented with concurrent flashes and taps and asked to count either the flashes or
the taps [9, 22]. The Bayesian model proposed by these authors assumed a joint prior distribution
with a near-diagonal form. The corresponding generative model assumes that the sensory sources
somehow interact with one another. A third experiment modulated the rates of flashes and beeps.
The task was to judge either the visual or the auditory modulation rate relative to a standard [23].
The data from this experiment were modeled using a joint prior distribution which is the sum of a
near-diagonal prior and a flat background.
While all these models are Bayesian in a formal sense, their underlying generative model does
not formalize the model selection process that underlies the combination of cues. This makes it
necessary to either estimate an empirical prior [11] by fitting it to human behavior or to assume an
ad hoc form [22, 23]. However, we believe that such assumptions are not needed. It was shown
recently that human judgments of spatial unity in an auditory-visual spatial localization task can be
described using a Bayesian inference model that infers causal structure [24, 25]. In this model, the
brain does not only estimate a stimulus variable, but also infers the probability that the two stimuli
have a common cause. In this paper we compare these different models on a large data set of human
position estimates in an auditory-visual task.
In this section we first describe the traditional cue integration model, then the recent models based
on joint stimulus priors, and finally the causal inference model. To relate to the experiment in the
next section, we will use the terminology of auditory-visual spatial localization, but the formalism
is very general.
2.1 Traditional cue integration
The traditional generative model of cue integration [26] has a single source location s which pro-
duces on each trial an internal representation (cue) of visual location, xV and one of auditory lo-
cation, xA. We assume that the noise processes by which these internal representations are gen-
erated are conditionally independent from each other and follow Gaussian distributions. That is,
p (xV |s) ∼ N (xV ; s, σV )and p (xA|s) ∼ N (xA; s, σA), where N (x;µ, σ) stands for the normal
distribution over x with mean µ and standard deviation σ. If on a given trial the internal representa-
tions are xV and xA, the probability that their source was s is given by Bayes’ rule,
p (s|xV , xA) ∝ p (xV |s) p (xA|s) .
If a subject performs maximum-likelihood estimation, then the estimate will be
sˆ = wV xV +wAxAwV +wA , where wV =
1
σ2
V
and wA = 1σ2
A
. It is important to keep in mind that this is the
estimate on a single trial. A psychophysical experimenter can never have access to xV and xA, which
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are the noisy internal representations. Instead, an experimenter will want to collect estimates over
many trials and is interested in the distribution of sˆ given sV and sA, which are the sources generated
by the experimenter. In a typical cue combination experiment, xV and xA are not actually generated
by the same source, but by different sources, a visual one sV and an auditory one sA. These sources
are chosen close to each other so that the subject can imagine that the resulting cues originate from
a single source and thus implicitly have a common cause. The experimentally observed distribution
is then
p (sˆ|sV , sA) =
∫ ∫
p (sˆ|xV , xA) p (xV |sV ) p (xA|sA) dxV dxA
Given that sˆ is a linear combination of two normally distributed variables, it will itself follow a
normal distribution, with mean〈sˆ〉 = wV sV +wAsAwV +wA and variance σ2sˆ = 1wV +wA . The reason that we
emphasize this point is because many authors identify the estimate distribution p (sˆ|sV , sA) with
the posterior distribution p (s|xV , xA). This is justified in this case because all distributions are
Gaussian and the estimate is a linear combination of cues. However, in the case of causal inference,
these conditions are violated and the estimate distribution will in general not be the same as the
posterior distribution.
2.2 Models with bisensory stimulus priors
Models with bisensory stimulus priors propose the posterior over source positions to be proportional
to the product of unimodal likelihoods and a two-dimensional prior:
p (sV , sA|xV , xA) = p (sV , sA) p (xV |sV ) p (xA|sA)
The traditional cue combination model has p (sV , sA) = p (sV ) δ (sV − sA), usually (as above)
even with p (sV ) uniform. The question arises what bisensory stimulus prior is appropriate. In [11],
the prior is estimated from data, has a large number of parameters, and is therefore limited in its
predictive power. In [23], it has the form
p (sV , sA) ∝ ω + e
− (sV −sA)
2
2σ2
coupling
while in [22] the additional assumption ω = 0 is made1.
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S
C
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Figure 1: Generative model of causal inference.
In all three models, the response distribu-
tion p (sˆV , sˆA|sV , sA) is obtained by iden-
tifying it with the posterior distribution
p (sV , sA|xV , xA). This procedure thus implic-
itly assumes that marginalizing over the latent
variables xV and xA is not necessary, which
leads to a significant error for non-Gaussian pri-
ors. In this paper we correctly deal with these
issues and in all cases marginalize over the la-
tent variables. The parametric models used for
the coupling between the cues lead to an ele-
gant low-dimensional model of cue integration
that allows for estimates of single cues that dif-
fer from one another.
2.3 Causal inference model
In the causal inference model [24, 25], we
start from the traditional cue integration model
but remove the assumption that two signals are
caused by the same source. Instead, the num-
ber of sources can be one or two and is itself a
variable that needs to be inferred from the cues.
1This family of Bayesian posterior distributions also includes one used to successfully model cue combina-
tion in depth perception [27, 28]. In depth perception, however, there is no notion of segregation as always a
single surface is assumed.
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If there are two sources, they are assumed to be independent. Thus, we use the graphical model
depicted in Fig. 1. We denote the number of sources by C. The probability distribution over C
given internal representations xV and xA is given by Bayes’ rule:
p (C|xV , xA) ∝ p (xV , xA|C) p (C) .
In this equation, p (C) is the a priori probability of C. We will denote the probability of a common
cause by pcommon, so that p (C = 1) = pcommon and p (C = 2) = 1 − pcommon. The probability of
generating xV and xA given C is obtained by inserting a summation over the sources:
p (xV , xA|C = 1) =
∫
p (xV , xA|s)p (s) ds =
∫
p (xV |s) p (xA|s)p (s) ds
Here p (s) is a prior for spatial location, which we assume to be distributed as N (s; 0, σP ). Then all
three factors in this integral are Gaussians, allowing for an analytic solution: p (xV , xA|C = 1) =
1
2pi
√
σ2
V
σ2
A
+σ2
V
σ2
P
+σ2
A
σ2
P
exp
[
− 12 (xV −xA)
2σ2P+x
2
V σ
2
A+x
2
Aσ
2
V
σ2
V
σ2
A
+σ2
V
σ2
P
+σ2
A
σ2
P
]
.
For p (xV , xA|C = 2) we realize that xV and xA are independent of each other and thus obtain
p (xV , xA|C = 2) =
(∫
p (xV |sV )p (sV ) dsV
)(∫
p (xA|sA)p (sA) dsA
)
Again, as all these distributions are assumed to be Gaussian, we obtain an analytic solution,
p (xV , xA|C = 2) = 1
2pi
√
(σ2V +σ2p)(σ2A+σ2p)
exp
[
− 12
(
x2V
σ2
V
+σ2p
+ x
2
A
σ2
A
+σ2p
)]
. Now that we have com-
puted p (C|xV , xA), the posterior distribution over sources is given by
p (si|xV , xA) =
∑
C=1,2
p (si|xV , xA, C) p (C|xV , xA)
where i can be V or A and the posteriors conditioned on C are well-known:
p (si|xA, xV , C = 1) = p (xA|si) p (xV |si) p (si)∫
p (xA|s) p (xV |s) p (s) ds , p (si|xA, xV , C = 2) =
p (xi|si) p (si)∫
p (xi|si) p (si) dsi
The former is the same as in the case of mandatory integration with a prior, the latter is simply
the unimodal posterior in the presence of a prior. Based on the posterior distribution on a given
trial, p (si|xV , xA), an estimate has to be created. For this, we use a sum-squared-error cost func-
tion, Cost =
〈
p (C = 1|xV , xA) (sˆ− s)2
〉
+
〈
p (C = 2|xV , xA) (sˆ− sV orA)2
〉
. Then the best
estimate is the mean of the posterior distribution, for instance for the visual estimation:
sˆV = p (C = 1|xA, xV ) sˆV,C=1 + p (C = 2|xA, xV ) sˆV,C=2
where sˆV,C=1 =
xV σ
−2
V
+xAσ
−2
A
+xPσ
−2
P
σ−2
V
+σ−2
A
+σ−2
P
and sˆV,C=2 =
xV σ
−2
V
+xPσ
−2
P
σ−2
V
+σ−2
P
. If pcommonequals 0 or
1, this estimate reduces to one of the conditioned estimates and is linear in xV and xA. If
0 < pcommon < 1, the estimate is a nonlinear combination of xV and xA, because of the func-
tional form of p (C|xV , xA). The response distributions, that is the distributions of sˆV and sˆA given
sV and sA over many trials, now cannot be identified with the posterior distribution on a single trial
and cannot be computed analytically either. The correct way to obtain the response distribution is to
simulate an experiment numerically.
Note that the causal inference model above can also be cast in the form of a bisensory stimulus prior
by integrating out the latent variable C, with:
p (sA, sV ) = p (C = 1) δ (sA − sV ) p (sA) + p (sA) p (sV ) p (C = 2)
However, in addition to justifying the form of the interaction between the cues, the causal inference
model has the advantage of being based on a generative model that well formalizes salient properties
of the world, and it thereby also allows to predict judgments of unity.
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3 Model performance and comparison
To examine the performance of the causal inference model and to compare it to previous models, we
performed a human psychophysics experiment in which we adopted the same dual-report paradigm
as was used in [11]. Observers were simultaneously presented with a brief visual and also an auditory
stimulus, each of which could originate from one of five locations on an imaginary horizontal line
(-10◦, -5◦, 0◦, 5◦, or 10◦ with respect to the fixation point). Auditory stimuli were 32 ms of white
noise filtered through an individually calibrated head related transfer function (HRTF) and presented
through a pair of headphones, whereas the visual stimuli were high contrast Gabors on a noisy
background presented on a 21-inch CRT monitor. Observers had to report by means of a key press
(1-5) the perceived positions of both the visual and the auditory stimulus. Each combination of
locations was presented with the same frequency over the course of the experiment. In this way, for
each condition, visual and auditory response histograms were obtained.
We obtained response distributions for each the three models described above by numeral simula-
tion. On each trial, estimation is followed by a step in which, the key is selected which corresponds
to the position closed to the best estimate. The simulated histograms obtained in this way were
compared to the measured response frequencies of all subjects by computing the R2 statistic.
The parameters in the causal inference model were optimized using fminsearch in MATLAB to
maximize R2. The best combination of parameters yielded an R2 of 0.97. The response frequencies
are depicted in Fig. 2. The bisensory prior models also explain most of the variance, withR2 = 0.96
for the Roach model and R2 = 0.91 for the Bresciani model. This shows that it is possible to model
cue combination for large disparities well using such models.
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Figure 2: A comparison between subjects’ performance and the causal inference model. The blue
line indicates the frequency of subjects responses to visual stimuli, red line is the responses to
auditory stimuli. Each set of lines is one set of audio-visual stimulus conditions. Rows of conditions
indicate constant visual stimulus, columns is constant audio stimulus. Model predictions is indicated
by the red and blue dotted line.
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3.1 Model comparison
To facilitate quantitative comparison with other models, we now fit the parameters of each model2 to
individual subject data, maximizing the likelihood of the model, i.e., the probability of the response
frequencies under the model. The causal inference model fits human data better than the other
models. Compared to the best fit of the causal inference model, the Bresciani model has a maximal
log likelihood ratio (base e) of the data of −22 ± 6 (mean ± s.e.m. over subjects), and the Roach
model has a maximal log likelihood ratio of the data of −18 ± 6. A causal inference model that
maximizes the probability of being correct instead of minimizing the mean squared error has a
maximal log likelihood ratio of −18± 3. These values are considered decisive evidence in favor of
the causal inference model that minimizes the mean squared error (for details, see [25]).
The parameter values found in the likelihood optimization of the causal model are as follows:
pcommon = 0.28 ± 0.05, σV = 2.14 ± 0.22◦, σA = 9.2 ± 1.1◦, σP = 12.3 ± 1.1◦ (mean ±
s.e.m. over subjects). We see that there is a relatively low prior probability of a common cause. In
this paradigm, auditory localization is considerably less precise than visual localization. Also, there
is a weak prior for central locations.
3.2 Localization bias
A useful quantity to gain more insight into the structure of multisensory data is the cross-modal
bias. In our experiment, relative auditory bias is defined as the difference between the mean au-
ditory estimate in a given condition and the real auditory position, divided by the difference be-
tween the real visual position and the real auditory position in this condition. If the influence
of vision on the auditory estimate is strong, then the relative auditory bias will be high (close
to one). It is well-known that bias decreases with spatial disparity and our experiment is no
exception (solid line in Fig. 3; data were combined between positive and negative disparities).
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Figure 3: Auditory bias as a function of spatial
disparity. Solid blue line: data. Red: Causal infer-
ence model. Green: Model by Roach et al. [23].
Purple: Model by Bresciani et al. [22]. Mod-
els were optimized on response frequencies (as in
Fig. 2), not on the bias data.
It can easily be shown that a traditional cue in-
tegration model would predict a bias equal to(
1 + σ
2
V
σ2
A
)−1
, which would be close to 1 and
independent of disparity, unlike the data. This
shows that a mandatory integration model is an
insufficient model of multisensory interactions.
We used the individual subject fittings from
above and and averaged the auditory bias val-
ues obtained from those fits (i.e. we did not
fit the bias data themselves). Fits are shown
in Fig. 3 (dashed lines). We applied a paired
t-test to the differences between the 5◦ and
20◦ disparity conditions (model-subject com-
parison). Using a double-sided test, the null
hypothesis that the difference between the bias
in the 5◦ and 20◦ conditions is correctly pre-
dicted by each model is rejected for the Bres-
ciani model (p < 0.002) and the Roach model
(p < 0.042) and accepted for the causal infer-
ence model (p > 0.17). Alternatively, with a
single-sided test, the hypothesis is rejected for
the Bresciani model (p < 0.001) and the Roach
model (p < 0.021) and accepted for the causal
inference model (> 0.9).
The reason that the Bresciani model fares worst
is that its prior distribution does not include a component that corresponds to independent causes. On
2The Roach et al. model has four free parameters (ω,σV , σA, σcoupling), the Bresciani et al. model has three
(σV , σA, σcoupling), and the causal inference model has four (pcommon,σV , σA, σP ). We do not consider the
Shams et al. model here, since it has many more parameters and it is not immediately clear how in this model
the erroneous identification of posterior with response distribution can be corrected.
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the contrary, the prior used in the Roach model contains two terms, one term that is independent of
the disparity and one term that decreases with increasing disparity. It is thus functionally somewhat
similar to the causal inference model.
4 Discussion
We have argued that any model of multisensory perception should account not only for situations
of small, but also of large conflict. In these situations, segregation is more likely, in which the two
stimuli are not perceived to have the same cause. Even when segregation occurs, the two stimuli can
still influence each other.
We compared three Bayesian models designed to account for situations of large conflict by apply-
ing them to auditory-visual spatial localization data. We pointed out a common mistake: for non-
Gaussian bisensory priors without mandatory integration, the response distribution can no longer
be identified with the posterior distribution. After correct implementation of the three models, we
found that the causal inference model is superior to the models with ad hoc bisensory priors. This is
expected, as the nervous system actually needs to solve the problem of deciding which stimuli have
a common cause and which stimuli are unrelated.
We have seen that multisensory perception is a suitable tool for studying causal inference. How-
ever, the causal inference model also has the potential to quantitatively explain a number of other
perceptual phenomena, including perceptual grouping and binding, as well as within-modality cue
combination [27, 28]. Causal inference is a universal problem: whenever the brain has multiple
pieces of information it must decide if they relate to one another or are independent.
As the causal inference model describes how the brain processes probabilistic sensory information,
the question arises about the neural basis of these processes. Neural populations encode probability
distributions over stimuli through Bayes’ rule, a type of coding known as probabilistic population
coding. Recent work has shown how the optimal cue combination assuming a common cause can
be implemented in probabilistic population codes through simple linear operations on neural activ-
ities [29]. This framework makes essential use of the structure of neural variability and leads to
physiological predictions for activity in areas that combine multisensory input, such as the superior
colliculus. Computational mechanisms for causal inference are expected have a neural substrate that
generalizes these linear operations on population activities. A neural implementation of the causal
inference model will open the door to a complete neural theory of multisensory perception.
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